January 6 Committee report · Jack Smith’s report
January 6: The effort to overturn the election
Donald Trump’s effort to remain in office after losing the 2020 election extended across seven states, the Justice Department, his campaign and the vice president’s office before converging on Congress on Jan. 6, 2021. The House investigation and special counsel Jack Smith’s report document pressure on state officials, the organization of competing electoral certificates, attempts to enlist federal authority and demands that Mike Pence interfere with the electoral count. They also describe rally financing, extremist preparations, the attack on the Capitol and Trump’s actions while Congress was under siege.
Pressure on the states
After the election, Trump and his allies pursued challenges to Biden’s victories while seeking intervention from state officials and legislators. In Georgia, Trump’s January 2 call to Brad Raffensperger included a request to find 11,780 votes, one more than Biden’s certified margin. Raffensperger rejected the assertions presented during the call. Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers described pressure from Trump and Giuliani and sought evidence. Michigan legislative leaders Mike Shirkey and Lee Chatfield met Trump at the White House on November 20; they did not replace Michigan’s electors. [1, 2]
The seven-state elector operation
On December 14, 2020, Trump supporters signed electoral certificates in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, all states Biden won. The House report traces the plan through Chesebro’s memoranda, Giuliani’s direction and Roman’s campaign coordination. Trump personally requested RNC assistance from McDaniel and introduced Eastman on the call. McDaniel did not recall its exact date. Pennsylvania and New Mexico included conditional language; the other five certificates asserted elector status without that contingency. Smith describes differences in what participants were told about how their documents would be used. [3, 9, 10]
From the states to the congressional count
All seven sets of documents were transmitted to Washington. The proposed uses included rejecting Biden’s votes, reducing the electoral total, referring the election to the House or delaying the count for further state action. Last-minute communications sought delivery of Michigan and Wisconsin certificates to Pence’s office. Pence aide Chris Hodgson rejected a proposed delivery through Sen. Ron Johnson’s staff. [3, 5, 9]
Bringing federal authority into the effort
Scott Perry helped introduce Jeffrey Clark to Trump. Clark promoted a proposed Justice Department letter asserting election concerns and urging state legislative action. Rosen and Donoghue rejected the draft. On January 3, senior officials warned of resignations if Trump replaced Rosen with Clark. The letter was not sent and Clark was not installed. Separately, Eastman urged Pence to reject or delay electoral votes. Pence and counsel Greg Jacob rejected the claimed authority. [4, 5, 9]
Mobilization, financing and extremist connections
Trump’s December 19 invitation to Washington became an organizing reference point. The House report documents preparations by the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, rally organizers and transportation promoters. It describes Fancelli’s $3 million mobilization funding plan, including $500,000 allocated to Tea Party Express for buses and advertising. Smith separately identifies a $2.1 million private donation funding the Ellipse rally. These amounts describe different scopes and are not added together as bus spending. On January 5, Tarrio and Rhodes met in a Washington parking garage with SoRelle, Gracia and Macias; Quested recorded part of the encounter. Stone’s documented security and communication relationships are separate from attendance at that meeting. [6, 9]
The attack and the electoral count
The first perimeter breach occurred at approximately 12:53–12:54 p.m., while Trump was still speaking. Proud Boys members had already moved toward the Capitol; people arriving later from the rally joined a confrontation underway. Attackers broke windows, forced doors and assaulted officers. Congress suspended its proceedings and Pence was moved to safety. The Justice Department reported approximately 140 officers assaulted. The House and FBI accounts describe individual attacks on Edwards, Fanone and Hodges. The reports document threats against Pence, who continued to refuse to interfere with the count. [5, 8, 11, 12]
Trump’s response during the attack
At 2:24 p.m., Trump posted that Pence lacked the courage to take the action he demanded. The House report examines the 187 minutes between the end of Trump’s speech at 1:10 p.m. and his 4:17 p.m. video telling the crowd to go home. It documents repeated requests for intervention and Trump’s television viewing. Giuliani continued seeking objections or delay, and Eastman proposed additional delay in an email to Jacob late that night. Congress reconvened that evening and completed certification early January 7. [5, 7, 9]
Investigations and the subsequent record
Smith’s investigation charged Trump with conspiracy to defraud the United States, obstruction-related offenses and conspiracy against rights. The report describes the evidence and the effects of the Supreme Court’s immunity decision. The case was dismissed without prejudice in November 2024 following Trump’s reelection and DOJ’s policy against prosecuting a sitting president. The January 20, 2025 proclamation subsequently pardoned or commuted sentences for people prosecuted in connection with January 6 and directed dismissal of covered pending cases. These later events belong alongside the historical conduct and court records. [9, 13]
The documented sequence
The record runs from pressure on state officials through the seven-state certificate operation, attempted Justice Department intervention and demands on Pence, then into the mobilization and violence that interrupted Congress. Calls, memoranda, certificates, messages, testimony and recorded actions identify the participants and the connections. The map follows those documented relationships; selecting a place, person or line opens its explanation and sources. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]
Unresolved: a reconciled bus-payment and passenger record; unrecorded portions of meetings; additional underlying exhibits and individual case updates.
Sources
- House January 6 final report, chapter 1
- House January 6 final report, chapter 2
- House January 6 final report, chapter 3
- House January 6 final report, chapter 4
- House January 6 final report, chapter 5
- House January 6 final report, chapter 6
- House January 6 final report, chapter 7
- House January 6 final report, chapter 8
- Jack Smith, Final Report, Volume I, January 2025
- National Archives: unofficial electoral certificates
- Justice Department: second anniversary of January 6
- FBI: Capitol violence and individual cases
- January 20, 2025 clemency proclamation
- USCP: Medical examiner findings on Brian Sicknick
Supporting people and location reports
Donald Trump
The House report traces Trump’s pressure on state officials, his request for RNC help with contingent electors, his consideration of replacing the acting attorney general and his demands that Mike Pence reject or delay electoral votes. The White House marker anchors documented presidential meetings and actions during this period.
The committee records that Trump introduced Ronna McDaniel to John Eastman during a call before December 14. McDaniel did not recall the exact date. House chapter 3, section 3.2, notes 36–38.
On January 6, the committee places the end of Trump’s speech at 1:10 p.m. and his go-home video at 4:17 p.m. It documents requests for intervention during that interval.
U.S. Capitol
Congress began counting electoral votes on January 6. The attack interrupted the proceedings; Pence was moved to safety. Congress resumed that evening and completed certification early January 7.
Ellipse rally
Trump addressed the January 6 rally at the Ellipse. The first Capitol perimeter breach occurred before his speech ended. Later rally participants and the earlier Proud Boys group reached the Capitol by distinct movements.
Rudy Giuliani
Giuliani directed the elector effort after senior campaign lawyers reduced their involvement. He pressed state officials, spoke at the Ellipse and contacted lawmakers seeking objections or delay after the attack began.
Kenneth Chesebro
Chesebro’s November 18 and December memoranda developed from a Wisconsin litigation contingency into proposals involving electoral certificates from multiple states and their use in the congressional count.
John Eastman
Eastman proposed that Pence reject electoral votes or delay the count. He participated in the RNC assistance call and discussions with Trump and Pence. Pence and counsel Greg Jacob rejected his proposed authority. Eastman sought further delay in an email to Jacob late on January 6.
Ronna McDaniel
McDaniel told the committee that Trump called and introduced John Eastman, who sought RNC assistance gathering contingent electors. She agreed to help. A December 14 elector recap she forwarded was relayed to Trump. She said she understood the slates to be contingent on court authorization.
House chapter 3, section 3.2, notes 36–38: McDaniel did not recall the exact call date. Section 3.6, notes 101–102: the elector recap and response from Trump’s assistant.
Michael Roman
Roman and campaign personnel tracked elector participation, worked on replacements and coordinated the state operation. The House report identifies an elector whip team and communications reporting completed votes and mailed paperwork.
Mark Meadows
Cassidy Hutchinson told the committee that Meadows followed the elector effort through repeated calls, meetings and outreach. The report also documents his role in communications surrounding state pressure and the White House response.
Mike Pence
Pence refused Trump’s demands to reject or delay electoral votes. He was removed from the Senate floor during the attack, remained at the Capitol complex and returned to the proceedings that evening. The reports document threats and chants against him and Trump’s 2:24 p.m. post attacking his refusal.
Greg Jacob
Pence’s counsel examined Eastman’s proposed use of vice-presidential power and rejected it. His communications with Eastman document objections before January 6 and Eastman’s request for additional delay that night.
Chris Hodgson
Pence aide Chris Hodgson refused a proposed delivery of Michigan and Wisconsin elector certificates through Sen. Ron Johnson’s staff. The House report identifies the staff communications rather than attributing every action to the elected officials themselves.
Justice Department
Jeffrey Clark promoted a draft letter asserting election concerns and urging state legislative action. Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue rejected it. At the January 3 White House meeting, senior officials warned of resignations if Clark replaced Rosen. The letter was not sent and the replacement did not occur.
Jeffrey Clark
Justice Department official Jeffrey Clark advocated the draft letter and a leadership change. He is not campaign lawyer Justin Clark.
Jeffrey Rosen
Acting Attorney General Rosen rejected Clark’s proposed letter and resisted efforts to enlist the department in overturning the result.
Richard Donoghue
Donoghue rejected election claims and documented Trump’s December 27 request to describe the election as corrupt. He warned of resignations at the January 3 meeting.
Scott Perry
Rep. Scott Perry helped introduce Jeffrey Clark to Trump.
Ken Klukowski
Klukowski worked on the draft letter at Clark’s direction.
Arizona electors
On December 14, 2020, Trump supporters in Arizona signed a certificate casting electoral votes for Trump despite Biden’s certified victory. The certificate asserted elector status without the contingency language included in Pennsylvania and New Mexico. The National Archives provides the original certificate and its signatories.
Georgia electors
On December 14, 2020, Trump supporters in Georgia signed a certificate casting electoral votes for Trump despite Biden’s certified victory. The certificate asserted elector status without the contingency language included in Pennsylvania and New Mexico. The National Archives provides the original certificate and its signatories. The House report describes a state Capitol meeting and Robert Sinners’ email to Roman reporting that votes were cast, paperwork completed and the documents being mailed.
Michigan electors
On December 14, 2020, Trump supporters in Michigan signed a certificate casting electoral votes for Trump despite Biden’s certified victory. The certificate asserted elector status without the contingency language included in Pennsylvania and New Mexico. The National Archives provides the original certificate and its signatories. The House report places the signing at state Republican Party headquarters.
Nevada electors
On December 14, 2020, Trump supporters in Nevada signed a certificate casting electoral votes for Trump despite Biden’s certified victory. The certificate asserted elector status without the contingency language included in Pennsylvania and New Mexico. The National Archives provides the original certificate and its signatories.
New Mexico electors
On December 14, 2020, Trump supporters in New Mexico signed a certificate casting electoral votes for Trump despite Biden’s certified victory. The certificate included language conditioning its use on a subsequent legal outcome. The National Archives provides the original certificate and its signatories.
Pennsylvania electors
On December 14, 2020, Trump supporters in Pennsylvania signed a certificate casting electoral votes for Trump despite Biden’s certified victory. The certificate included language conditioning its use on a subsequent legal outcome. The National Archives provides the original certificate and its signatories.
Wisconsin electors
On December 14, 2020, Trump supporters in Wisconsin signed a certificate casting electoral votes for Trump despite Biden’s certified victory. The certificate asserted elector status without the contingency language included in Pennsylvania and New Mexico. The National Archives provides the original certificate and its signatories.
Robert Sinners
The House report cites Sinners’ December 14 email to Michael Roman and others: votes were cast, paperwork completed and being mailed. It also describes instructions for discretion when attending the Georgia meeting.
Rusty Bowers
Arizona House Speaker Bowers rejected requests for legislative intervention and sought evidence for the election claims.
Brad Raffensperger
During the January 2 recorded call, Trump asked Georgia’s secretary of state to find 11,780 votes. Raffensperger rejected the allegations presented in the call.
Brian Kemp
Georgia’s governor rejected demands for a special legislative session to revisit the election result.
Geoff Duncan
Georgia’s lieutenant governor opposed demands for a special legislative session to alter the result.
Mike Shirkey
Michigan’s Senate majority leader met Trump at the White House on November 20. Michigan’s legislative leadership did not replace the state’s electors.
Lee Chatfield
Michigan’s House speaker met Trump at the White House on November 20. The House report places this meeting within the state-pressure effort.
Doug Mastriano
Mastriano supported Pennsylvania hearings and organizing and communicated with Trump’s circle about legislative intervention.
Rally funding and buses
The House report describes Julie Fancelli’s $3 million mobilization funding plan, including $500,000 allocated to Tea Party Express for buses and centralized advertising. Smith separately describes a $2.1 million private donation funding the Ellipse rally. These are different scopes, not additive bus expenses.
House chapter 6, section 6.12, notes 410–413; Smith printed page 24, note 99.
Ali Alexander advertised 25 additional charter buses on December 29. The reviewed records do not reconcile all invoices with specific passengers.
Julie Fancelli
Fancelli’s broader mobilization funding plan was developed with Caroline Wren. The House report describes allocations for buses, advertising and organizing.
Caroline Wren
Wren helped raise and coordinate rally funding and communicated about financing transportation. The report connects her work to Fancelli, event organizers and bus requests.
Tea Party Express
The House report identifies a $500,000 allocation for a busing program and centralized advertising. The amount is not a verified buses-only expenditure.
Women for America First
Amy and Kylie Kremer’s organization handled event permits, organizing and mobilization for the rally. The House report describes funding and contacts with other organizers.
Ali Alexander
The Stop the Steal organizer promoted transportation, worked with rally organizers and marched toward the Capitol with Alex Jones. On December 29 he advertised 25 additional charter buses.
Alex Jones
Jones promoted mobilization, had fundraising and organizing contacts, and led a group toward the Capitol with Ali Alexander.
Roger Stone
The House report documents Stone’s relationships with Proud Boys members, Oath Keepers security arrangements and the Friends of Stone Signal group. These are separately described communications and security relationships.
Enrique Tarrio
Tarrio participated in the January 5 garage encounter with Rhodes and others after his release from arrest. He left Washington and monitored events remotely on January 6.
Stewart Rhodes
The Oath Keepers founder participated in the January 5 garage encounter, organized armed quick-reaction contingents outside Washington and was on Capitol grounds on January 6.
January 5 garage meeting
Tarrio, Rhodes, Kellye SoRelle, Bianca Gracia and Joshua Macias participated in the parking-garage encounter recorded in part by Nick Quested. Part of the conversation was not recorded. Stone is not identified as an attendee.
Kellye SoRelle
Participated in the January 5 garage encounter.
Bianca Gracia
Participated in the January 5 garage encounter.
Joshua Macias
Participated in the January 5 garage encounter.
Nick Quested
Filmed portions of the January 5 garage encounter. His role here is as a filmmaker and source.
Proud Boys movement
A Proud Boys group began moving from the Washington Monument toward the Capitol at about 10:30 a.m. Leaders on the ground included Joe Biggs, Ethan Nordean and Zachary Rehl. The committee distinguishes this movement from the later arrival of Ellipse attendees.
Joe Biggs
The House report identifies him among Proud Boys leaders on the ground during the group’s movement before and during the Capitol attack.
Ethan Nordean
The House report identifies him among Proud Boys leaders on the ground during the group’s movement before and during the Capitol attack.
Zachary Rehl
The House report identifies him among Proud Boys leaders on the ground during the group’s movement before and during the Capitol attack.
First perimeter breach
At approximately 12:53–12:54 p.m., attackers breached the initial barricade near Peace Circle. Caroline Edwards was knocked down and struck her head on steps. This preceded the end of Trump’s speech.
Lower West Terrace
Officers fought attackers in the tunnel and surrounding west-side approaches. The records describe Michael Fanone being dragged into the crowd, beaten and shocked, and Daniel Hodges being attacked and crushed in the tunnel.
East entrance
The committee records the initial east Rotunda-door breach around 2:24 p.m., renewed entry at 2:38 p.m. and an Oath Keepers stack entering around 2:40 p.m., followed by another around 3:15 p.m.
Police injuries and deaths
The Justice Department reported approximately 140 officers assaulted. The reports describe physical injuries and lasting psychological harm. Brian Sicknick died January 7; the medical examiner classified the death as natural causes and USCP recognized it as a line-of-duty death.
Caroline Edwards
Knocked down during the initial perimeter breach, striking her head on steps.
Michael Fanone
Dragged into the crowd, restrained, beaten and shocked with an electrical device.
Daniel Hodges
Attacked and crushed in the Lower West Terrace tunnel.
Eugene Goodman
Confronted and redirected rioters approaching the Senate area.
Investigation and later proceedings
Smith’s report describes the four federal charges, the effect of presidential immunity and the November 2024 dismissal following Trump’s reelection and DOJ’s sitting-president policy. It records his office’s assessment of the evidence. January 2025 clemency is a separate subsequent event in the Capitol cases.
The certified Electoral College result was 306 votes for Joe Biden and 232 for Donald Trump. Court records, public statements, congressional votes and financial disclosures document the challenges to the result and events surrounding January 6.
Open questions: coverage of remaining cases and financial organizers; allegations and court findings remain separately sourced in individual records.
The inventory contains 65 litigation entries, including 14 selected ruling summaries. Entries identify the case, docket, parties, allegations, dated decisions and cited court records.
Financial records cover rally planning, travel, political fundraising, legal defense and assistance to families. The collection records the named payers, recipients, amounts and stated purposes where available.
The collection links public invitations, speech passages and dated events to their source records.
Individual records identify lawmakers and their votes. Multiple records can belong to the same roll-call event.
Congress met at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, to count the Electoral College votes confirming Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential election. The attack interrupted that count. The January 6 committee documented the attack and the alternate-elector plan as parts of the effort to overturn the result and keep Donald Trump in office.
The committee found that Donald Trump oversaw a plan, involving campaign lawyers and participating Republican officials, to submit purported Trump electoral votes from seven states Biden had won. The aim was to have Vice President Mike Pence reject certified Biden votes in favor of those invalid slates. The committee identified Kenneth Chesebro, Rudy Giuliani and Mark Meadows among those involved and described assistance from RNC chair Ronna McDaniel and other officials, while noting that some participants did not understand the full plan.
After Donald Trump directed supporters at the Ellipse to march to the Capitol, arrivals joined a site where the attack had already begun. The committee documented efforts by Proud Boys, Oath Keepers and others to obstruct the transfer of power; it did not describe every rally attendee as having the same conduct or prior knowledge.
The attack interrupted the proceedings. Congress resumed the count, and certification concluded at 3:44 a.m. on January 7: Joe Biden received 306 electoral votes and Donald Trump 232. Neither chamber sustained objections to Arizona’s or Pennsylvania’s votes.
Alternate-elector certificates: Republican slates in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin submitted documents purporting to cast electoral votes for Donald Trump. The National Archives identifies these as unofficial certificates that were not accepted as evidence of official state action.
The January 6 committee reported that the proposed use of these certificates was part of an effort to replace or reject certified Biden electoral votes. Pennsylvania and New Mexico documents included conditional wording; their text differed from the other five states. The original certificates and correspondence are linked below.
Evidence scope: this introduction compares the National Archives’ official results and unofficial certificates with chapters 3 and 8 of the congressional report, checked September 21, 2026. It does not assign criminal liability to every participant or summarize the current outcome of every state prosecution.
Witnesses included members of Donald Trump’s own White House, including White House counsel Pat Cipollone, deputy press secretary Sarah Matthews and chief-of-staff aide Cassidy Hutchinson. Chapter 7 sets out their testimony about his response during the attack, with citations to the underlying interviews; their accounts and the committee’s conclusions are identified separately.
